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approach to intrusive memories of
trauma
Ian A. Clark*† and Clare E. Mackay
Department of Psychiatry, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
This hypothesis and theory paper presents a pragmatic framework to help bridge the
clinical presentation and neuroscience of intrusive memories following psychological
trauma. Intrusive memories are a hallmark symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). However, key questions, including those involving etiology, remain. In particular,
we know little about the brain mechanisms involved in why only some moments of the
trauma return as intrusive memories while others do not. We first present an overview
of the patient experience of intrusive memories and the neuroimaging studies that have
investigated intrusive memories in PTSD patients. Next, one mechanism of how to model
intrusive memories in the laboratory, the trauma film paradigm, is examined. In particular,
we focus on studies combining the trauma film paradigm with neuroimaging. Stemming
from the clinical presentation and our current understanding of the processes involved in
intrusive memories, we propose a framework in which an intrusive memory comprises
five component parts; autobiographical (trauma) memory, involuntary recall, negative
emotions, attention hijacking, and mental imagery. Each component part is considered
in turn, both behaviorally and from a brain imaging perspective. A mapping of these five
components onto our understanding of the brain is described. Unanswered questions
that exist in our understanding of intrusive memories are considered using the proposed
framework. Overall, we suggest that mental imagery is key to bridging the experience,
memory, and intrusive recollection of the traumatic event. Further, we suggest that
by considering the brain mechanisms involved in the component parts of an intrusive
memory, in particular mental imagery, we may be able to aid the development of a firmer
bridge between patients’ experiences of intrusive memories and the clinical neuroscience
behind them.
Keywords: post-traumatic stress disorder, mental imagery, intrusive memory, psychological trauma, experimental
psychopathology, trauma film paradigm, neuroimaging, flashbacks
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The Patient Experience of Intrusive
Memories
I was in the car outside my house. The mugger put a
knife to my neck; he said ‘give me your money’. I was
scared hewould realise that I live here; I wasworried for
my daughter. He then checked my pockets and asked
for my purse to check it and rummaged through it. I
was feeling helpless; I was worried I had forgotten some
money and he would find it and say I was lying to him.
He then ran off and I looked back tomy house to seemy
daughter crying and banging at the door. I felt guilty
that she may have seen what happened and that she
would be traumatised by it.
A patient’s description of a traumatic event, taken from
Holmes et al. (1).
Most people will experience or witness a traumatic event over
the course of their lifetime and a significant minority will go
on to develop post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (2, 3). A
hallmark symptom of PTSD is the experience of intrusive mem-
ories of the trauma (4). Clinically, intrusive memories are well
documented. Our understanding of intrusive memories at a neu-
roscientific level on the other hand is not. Here, we present a prag-
matic clinical-neuroscience framework for understanding intru-
sive memories, breaking intrusive memories into five component
parts. We suggest that mental imagery is key to bridging the
experience, memory, and intrusive recollection of the traumatic
event. By understanding the individual components, and how
mental imagery links each component together, we hope to be able
to help bridge the gap between patients’ experiences as seen in the
clinic and the clinical neuroscience behind them.
A traumatic event is defined not merely as a very stressful event
but specifically as experiencing or witnessing serious injury or
threat to the physical integrity to the self or others [Criterion A
of the American Psychiatric Association (APA), Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual 5 (DSM 5)] (4). This diagnostic criterion is
particularly interesting as PTSD is one of the few disorders in the
DSM5 that requires an index event to have occurred for diagnosis.
This opens up an area of investigation for clinical research to try
to understand how PTSD arises from a specific event.
Not everyone who experiences a traumatic event develops
PTSD. A diagnosis of PTSD requires four other types of symp-
toms in addition to experiencing psychological trauma. These are
the hallmark symptoms of re-experiencing, including intrusive
memories (Criterion B), persistent avoidance of trauma-related
stimuli (Criterion C), persistent symptoms of increased arousal
(Criterion D), and negative cognitions and mood (Criterion E),
all of which need to be present for at least 1month (Criterion F).
We focus here on the re-experiencing criterion of PTSD, specif-
ically on intrusive memories. Most people experience intrusive
memories after witnessing or experiencing a traumatic event,
some of whom will go on to develop PTSD. Intrusive memories
following trauma share many features between those individuals
who do go on to develop PTSD and those who do not (5). Trauma
can be re-experienced in different ways, all of which are highly
distressing experiences. Intrusive memories are the spontaneous
and repeated re-experiencing of the traumatic event, that is, invol-
untary images of the trauma intruding into consciousness (6). An
example related to the patient description of a traumatic event
described earlier [fromHolmes et al. (1)] would be (1) the sudden
image of the moment a mugger raised a knife, accompanied by an
intense feeling of fear and (2) a separate image of her daughter’s
crying face with the feeling of guilt.
Intrusive memories are rarely a replay of the entire traumatic
event from beginning to end. Patients often recall one specific
moment of the traumatic event at a time – known as a hotspot
(7, 8). Hotspots are idiosyncratic – different individuals could
witness the same trauma but have different hotspots that return
to mind unbidden. They can also represent a range of different
emotions that the individual experienced over the course of the
trauma. The events inTable 1 are the hotspots of a different patient
who was physically assaulted during a mugging. The hotspots
depict a range of negative emotions, in this case, fear, humiliation,
sadness, and degradation.On average, patients experience three to
four hotspots per trauma, including emotions of fear, helplessness,
anger, guilt, and shame (1, 9). These hotspots are those elements of
the traumatic event that are re-experienced as intrusivememories.
Not all experiences of trauma result in the persistent experience
of intrusive memories and a diagnosis of PTSD. The question
therefore arises as to why only some moments within a trauma
are later experienced as intrusive memories. This is not a straight-
forward question to answer, particularly as traumatic events are
difficult to study. Cognitive behavioral models of PTSD suggest
that cognitive processing during the traumatic event has a large
impact on the nature of the trauma memory (8, 10). Indeed,
one of the strongest predictors of the development of PTSD is
peritraumatic psychological processing (11), i.e., the individual’s
experience during and immediately after the traumatic event –
in particular, perceived life threat during the trauma, peritrau-
matic emotional responses, and peritraumatic dissociation. These
processes are thought to affect the formation of the memory,
the contextualization of the trauma within the experience, and
subsequent appraisals of the event [see Ref. (8, 10), and neural
models of PTSD and intrusive memories below]. Further, experi-
mental studies suggest that peritraumatic psychological processes
are also important for predicting intrusive memories following
analog trauma [e.g., Ref. (12), see also “Intrusive Memories in
the Laboratory” below]. The experience of the individual at the
time of the trauma seems, therefore, to be important for predicting
symptoms following trauma.
TABLE 1 | Hotspots from one PTSD patient during a mugging.
Event within trauma Emotional reaction
Hands pulling at bag They are trying to pull me over; Fear
Fallen down on the ground I have lost, they have won, I am stupid;
Humiliation
Kicked in stomach They are taking away my chance to have
children; Sadness
Assailants walking away slowly They cannot even be bothered to run;
Degraded
Each hotspot is associated with specific emotions and meanings that are present when
the images return as intrusive memories. Taken from Holmes et al. (1).
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Neural Models of PTSD and Intrusive
Memories
Traditional neurocircuitry models of PTSD highlight the impor-
tance of three main brain regions; the amygdala, and its inter-
actions with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and
the hippocampus (13, 14). These models predominantly stem
from animal work into fear conditioning, which has a number of
parallels with PTSD symptomatology. Specifically, in response to
threat-related stimuli, there is thought to be increased activation
in the amygdala due to a diminished ability of the vmPFC and
hippocampus to govern the amygdala responsiveness. Further,
hyperactivity in the amygdala is proposed to explain the distinct
emotional quality of memories of the trauma; hypo-response in
the vmPFC the inability to move attention away from the trauma-
related stimuli; and decreased hippocampal functionality that the
poor voluntary recall patients’ show in regards to the traumatic
event.
Neuroimaging studies in patients with PTSD show support for
these neurocircuitrymodels. The symptomprovocation paradigm
has been widely used in neuroimaging studies to examine the
brain activation occurring during the patient’s experience of PTSD
symptoms, such as intrusive memories. The paradigm involves
exposing individuals with PTSD to stimuli designed to trigger
their symptoms, e.g., visual images of combat situations (15) or
verbal autobiographical scripts of the patients’ trauma. Reviews of
symptom provocation neuroimaging studies (16–18) suggest that
PTSD patients’ symptom experience involves decreased activity
of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), medial PFC, parahip-
pocampus, and thalamus, and, generally, increased amygdala
activity.
Further work suggests that abnormal interactions between the
hippocampus and vmPFCmay arise after developing PTSD, while
abnormalities in the amygdala and dorsal ACC may be predis-
posing (19). However, while these structures may explain some
elements of PTSD, it is unlikely that they alone can explain all
symptoms associated with PTSD (20), in particular given the
number of regions identified by symptom provocation studies.
Thus, it is currently uncertain which of these brain regions may
be associated directly with intrusive memories, and which others
may be associated with, for example, increases in arousal.
A distinct model of intrusive memories stems from clinical
psychology and the neuroscience of memory. Brewin et al. (21),
see also Ref. (22), suggest that there are two forms of memory
representations – those that are abstract and contextually bound,
and those that are sensory and affective in nature and not con-
textually bound. In a healthy memory, these two representations
are connected. An intrusive memory on the other hand has a
strong sensory representation that is not connected to its con-
textual representation. This allows the memory to be easily cued
by trauma-related information and without any autobiographi-
cal context – creating the re-experiencing feelings common to
intrusive memories. Relating these concepts to neural mecha-
nisms, Brewin et al. suggest, in line with neurocircuitry models
of PTSD, that intrusive memories occur due to hyper-activation
in the amygdala and insula, which is disconnected from the hip-
pocampus and related memory structures that are required to
provide contextual autobiographical information. Coupled with
visual imagery (suggested to be mediated by the precuneus), the
intrusive memory then appears involuntarily in mind as a visual
memory.
Support for these suggestions also stems from patient studies
investigating intrusive memories directly. Only a small number
of studies have been able to investigate the explicit occurrence
of intrusive memories. The symptom provocation paradigm does
not always cause patients to experience intrusive memories. The
paradigm serves as a reminder of the trauma, bringing trauma
memories to mind, causing, for example, heighted emotional
responses and avoidance, but does not necessarily cause involun-
tary intrusive memories. To our knowledge, only four neuroimag-
ing studies of PTSD have explicitly reported the brain activation
of patients experiencing “flashbacks” while undergoing symptom
provocation (23–26). These studies suggest that the experience
of an intrusive memory may involve increased activity in limbic
and paralimbic areas including the insula, ACC, thalamus, and
amygdala, and decreased activation in inferior frontal areas –
presenting clues as to those regions that may be involved in
intrusive memories specifically. While it should be noted that
these studies did not capture the moment of intrusive mem-
ory involuntary recall, but rather the more general experience
surrounding intrusive memories, they do share similarities with
the neural mechanisms proposed to underlie intrusive memories
(13, 14, 21).
The above-mentioned neuroimaging studies all examined brain
activation in patients once symptoms are already established. Key
questions including those involving etiology nevertheless remain.
For example, why do some people experience intrusive mem-
ories and not others? Why do certain moments of the original
trauma return as intrusive memories but not others? While it is
not possible to investigate the brain mechanisms behind symp-
tom development during real trauma, analog models may offer a
prospective methodology to investigate the etiology of intrusive
memories.
Intrusive Memories in the Laboratory
Real life traumatic events and the subsequent development of
intrusivememories are difficult to study in laboratory settings due
to both ethical and practical reasons. The trauma film paradigm
(Figure 1) is a well-established method to provide an analog
model to prospectively investigate intrusive memories in con-
trolled laboratory settings (27–29). In the paradigm, healthy par-
ticipants watch a film depicting traumatic events, such as the
aftermath of real life car crashes. Participants typically experi-
ence several intrusive memories to events in the film during the
following week, operationalized to participants as: (1) moments
of the film spontaneously popping into mind unexpectedly and
(2) mental images, i.e., taking the form of pictures, sounds, or
bodily sensations. These intrusive memories are recorded in a
diary, similar to diaries given to PTSD patients undergoing CBT.
The majority of participants experience at least 1 intrusive mem-
ory to events in the film, with an average frequency (from 16
studies, totaling 458 participants) of around 5–6 (12). Information
recorded in the diary allows for features of the intrusive memory
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FIGURE 1 | Diagram of the general procedure of the trauma film paradigm. Participants view a distressing film as an analog of a traumatic event. Over the
following week they record any intrusive memories of the film in a diary. This allows for investigation of baseline differences affecting intrusive memory development,
or tasks that might increase/decrease later intrusive memories.
(e.g., number, vividness, emotional rating) to be recorded as
well as identification of the film scene (analog hotspot) that the
memory originated from.
We note that the trauma film paradigm is an analog method-
ology and not the same as experiencing real life trauma. While
findings are preliminary, repeated exposure to electronic media
images of the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001 have been
associated with measures of PTSD symptoms 2–3 years later,
though predominantly for those individuals viewing >4 h a day for
the week following the attack (30). Further, individuals repeatedly
exposed to media footage of the 2013 Bostonmarathon bombings
(6 h a day for the week following the bombings) reported higher
acute stress symptoms 2–4weeks later than those directly exposed
to the event (31). While the DSM 5 has also acknowledged within
the PTSD diagnosis that exposure to trauma images through
electronicmedia, television, andmovies in the line of work (4) can
be sufficient to lead to PTSD, the full relationship between media
exposure and PTSD symptoms is unclear. Regardless, given the
potential for electronic media images to cause symptoms, under-
standing PTSD symptom development from electronic media
images of trauma remains pertinent, in addition to being able to
inform on real life symptom development.
The trauma film paradigm has allowed for detailed investiga-
tion into peritraumatic factors that may affect symptom devel-
opment, which can be more difficult in clinical research studies
due to data often being collected retrospectively. For example,
research has shown that performing visuospatial tasks during,
or soon after, exposure to analog trauma can reduce intrusive
memory frequency [e.g., Ref. (28, 32)]. Further, changes in state
anxiety (33) and emotional processing (12) in response to film
viewing have been associated with intrusive memory frequency,
as well as possible vulnerability factors, e.g., attentional control
(34). The trauma film paradigm therefore offers an opportunity
to investigate the development of intrusive memories in con-
trolled settings, in particular, peritraumatic factors. The trauma
film paradigm therefore opened up a possible mechanism to
understand the brain mechanisms involved in intrusive memory
formation.
Neuroimaging the Encoding of Analog
Intrusive Memories
To our knowledge, only two studies have used neuroimag-
ing to investigate the encoding of emotional images during a
trauma film that participants later re-experience as intrusive
memories (35, Clark et al., under review).
Bourne et al. (35) conducted the first study implementing
the trauma film paradigm to examine the differences in brain
activations when viewing “Potential scenes” (unpleasant scenes
that elicited intrusive memories in other participants but not
in that participant), with “Intrusive (referred to as Flashback)
scenes” (those unpleasant scenes that did elicit intrusive memo-
ries). Results suggested a widespread neural signature at the time
of viewing those scenes that would later be re-experienced as
intrusive memories including increased activation in the amyg-
dala, thalamus, rostral ACC, striatum, and ventral occipital cortex.
Additionally, two regions seemed to distinguish between intrusive
scenes and potential scenes: the left inferior frontal gyrus and
middle temporal gyrus.
Given potential limitations and difficulties in studying the neu-
ral basis of rare idiosyncratic events, such as intrusive memories
(e.g., low event count), replication of these results was important.
We therefore conducted a second experiment using an indepen-
dent sample finding an almost exact replication of our previous
results (Clark et al., under review). Additionally, using multivari-
ate pattern analysis techniques, we were also able to predict later
intrusive memory occurrence solely from the brain activity at the
time of viewing traumatic footage (36). Thus, these results suggest
that, at the time of trauma, the brain is responding differently
to those scenes that later become intrusive memories compared
to those scenes that do not cause intrusive memories for that
individual. Given the widespread nature of these activations, it
is important to understand how these regions may be involved
in the formation of an intrusive memory. That is, what is it that
makes the combination of these activations lead to the later invol-
untary re-experiencing of that specific event during psychological
trauma?
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A Clinical-Neuroscience Framework of
Intrusive Memories
We therefore aim to build upon previous theories and research
into the underlying neural mechanisms of intrusive memories.
Current neural theories suggest that intrusivememories occur due
to poor integration of the trauma into memory (21). Given the
proposed parallels between fear conditioning and PTSD (13), it
is also possible that the brain processes involved in fear condi-
tioning contribute directly to intrusive memory formation. We
suggest that further cognitive processes in addition to fear con-
ditioning may also be involved in intrusive memory formation
and recollection. For example, intrusive memories are not purely
fear based, involving multiple other emotions, for example, help-
lessness, anger, guilt, and shame (1, 9) – a fear conditioning
account may therefore be only able to explain some of the under-
lying mechanisms. Brewin et al. (21) highlight disrupted autobi-
ographical memory encoding, in combination with heightened
emotional processing and mental imagery, yet our recent neu-
roimaging work investigating analog intrusive memory formation
(35, Clark et al., under review) suggests, in contrast, heightened
involvement of memory-related areas in addition to emotional
processing and mental imagery. As such, we propose a pragmatic
clinical-neuroscience framework of intrusive memories taking
intrusive memories as part of a continuum of normal functioning.
We suggest that by looking at intrusive memories as a combina-
tion of non-clinical cognitive processes that have been researched
outside of the clinical literature in detail, we can use knowledge of
these areas to help inform our understanding of the mechanisms
behind intrusive memories.
Cognitive models and clinical descriptions suggest that intru-
sive memories are sensory–perceptual (predominantly visual)
emotional memories of traumatic events that intrude involuntar-
ily into consciousness, hijacking current selective attention (4, 8,
21, 22, 37, 38). We therefore divide intrusive memories into five
component parts; autobiographical (trauma) memory, involun-
tary recall, emotional processing, attention hijacking, and mental
imagery (Figure 2). We hypothesize that heighted involvement of
each of these cognitive processes are involved in the underlying
mechanisms of the formation and experience of an intrusive
memory. In the following sections, we review each component in
terms of its everyday cognitive process, suggest how each of these
five components are involved in intrusive memories and briefly
summarize what is known of the neural components behind them.
We then map the patient experience of an intrusive memory onto
the brain, culminating in Figure 3, with the components of our
clinical-neuroscience framework in the center surrounded by the
different brain areas involved.
Autobiographical (Trauma) Memory
An autobiographical memory is a personal memory that either
corresponds to a particular episode in life, or to a more gen-
eral experience that has particular personal relevance (39). The
autobiographical component of an intrusivememory corresponds
to the personal experiencing (Criterion A) and subsequent re-
experiencing (Criterion B) of the traumatic event, as set out in
FIGURE 2 | A proposed clinical-neuroscience framework of intrusive
memories breaking intrusive memories into five component parts.
the DSM 5 (4). The importance of autobiographical memory
for intrusive memories is acknowledged in cognitive and clinical
theories of PTSD (8, 21, 38).
The literature surrounding autobiographical memory is vast;
for recent reviews on the neuroimaging of memory, see Cabeza
andNyberg (40) and Spaniol et al. (41).Overall, these reviews con-
clude that autobiographical memory is normally associated with
activity in the right anterior and lateral prefrontal gyri, the medial
temporal lobe, the lateral andmedial parietal regions, and the pos-
terior cingulate cortex. Specifically, the ventrolateral prefrontal
gyrus and medial temporal lobes are thought to be involved in
encoding, while the left superior parietal gyrus and the dorsolat-
eral and anterior prefrontal gyrus are thought to play an important
role in recall (41–43). The “subsequent memory effect” suggests
that activity at encoding in left prefrontal and bilateral middle
temporal regions can predict later successful memory recall (44,
45). Additionally, it is thought that the full encoding of a memory
takes place in a 6-h window (46, 47), a process known as consoli-
dation. Research has implicated the involvement of the hippocam-
pus in particular, but cortical areas including the nucleus accum-
bens and ventral striatum are also proposed to be involved (48).
Involuntary Recall
Involuntary recall is the return of a mental state that was once
present in consciousness with apparent spontaneity and without
any act of will or previous attempts at retrieval (49–51). Intrusive
memories come to mind spontaneously and in an unbidden man-
ner, and are, therefore, recalled involuntarily. Thus, it is important
to understand how the traumatic event is involuntarily, as opposed
to voluntarily or deliberately, recalled as is often researched within
autobiographical memory.
Behavioral and cognitive differences between involuntary and
voluntary recall have been widely reported on. For example,
involuntary recall is characterized by shorter retrieval times (52)
and involuntary memories are more often of specific episodes
than deliberately recalled memories [(32, 53), see also Ref. (54,
55)]. However, to our knowledge, there are only a handful of
neuroimaging studies that have directly compared voluntary
and involuntary recall (56–60). Further, only one study showed
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FIGURE 3 | Diagram mapping the patient experience of an intrusive memory onto the brain. The components of our clinical-neuroscience framework are in
the center, surrounded by the different brain areas involved.
increased activation during involuntary compared to voluntary
recall – in the left middle frontal gyrus and left superior frontal
gyrus (57). On the other hand, greater activation for voluntary
versus involuntary recall has been found in the right dorsolateral
frontal cortex and parietal cortex (56, 58), in the right middle
frontal gyrus (57), the left dorsolateral PFC (61), and the hip-
pocampus and amygdala (59). Overall, these studies suggest that
while both involuntary recall and voluntary recall activate regions
associated with autobiographical memory, voluntary recall addi-
tionally activates areas associated with strategic recall. However,
it remains to be established whether these findings can also be
generalized to intrusive memory involuntary recall, and further
replication of regions associated with involuntary over voluntary
recall is required.
Emotional Processing
Emotion is a subjective, conscious experience characterized by
biological reactions, and an individual’s current mental state.
The patient experience of intrusive memories is characterized by
strong negative emotions. Emotional processing at the time of
trauma has also been highlighted as important for later PTSD
development (11) and for intrusive memories following analog
trauma (12). Hyperactivity of emotional regions has also previ-
ously been proposed to be important in both PTSD and intrusive
memory development (13, 21).
It is important to define these emotions as negative when
investigating intrusive memories experimentally as involuntary
memories are not always distressing. Research has found that
involuntary memories are not limited to negative experiences
or indeed to clinical populations – a telephone survey of 1500
Danes identified that approximately 60% of involuntary memo-
ries reported were positive in nature (62). Additionally, positive
involuntary memories in the laboratory have also been associated
with increased (positive) emotional processing at the time of
encoding (63). Behaviorally and clinically, intrusive memories are
regarded as negative, whether a distinction between negative and
positive emotion is required, however, is less clear in terms of the
mechanisms underlying intrusive (or involuntary) memories.
At a neural level, research into emotion often implicates the
amygdala, ACC, and the PFC (64–66). The amygdala is tradi-
tionally associated with negative emotions, especially that of fear
(66, 67). However, more recent work suggests that the amygdala
is also involved in positive emotions (68) and that the amygdala
may respond to emotional salience rather than to whether the
emotion is positive or negative (69). Indeed, amygdala activation
at encoding has been associated with success of recall regardless
of emotional valence (70, 71). Additionally, the ACC is often
implicated in threat detection, and the PFC is thought to be
involved in emotion regulation – allowing top down control in
response to emotional situations (64, 72). At a neural level there-
fore, emotional valence may be less important than the intensity
of the experienced emotion, i.e., how emotionally salient the event
was, or there may be a down play in top down control of emotion
regulation.
Attention Hijacking
Sensory information in the world around us is abundant, and
attention is used to select the information that is relevant at a given
time (73). Attention hijacking is the overriding of this selective
attention geared toward our current goal, transferring attention
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to something else. To become salient, an intrusive memory must
hijack attention to some degree.
How might an intrusive memory override selective attention?
Research suggests that PTSD patients have enhanced priming
for perceptual and verbal trauma-related stimuli (74, 75). Mea-
surement of this enhanced priming soon after trauma was also
associated with symptom severity at later follow-ups. Compari-
son of PTSD patients and trauma-exposed controls suggests that
enhanced priming for trauma-related stimuli may be an inability
of patients tomove their attention away from trauma-related stim-
uli and not an increase of facilitated attention to trauma-related
stimuli (76, 77). A poor ability to remove information that is no
longer relevant from mind, measured in non-clinical participants
before viewing traumatic footage, has also been associated with
intrusive memory frequency in the subsequent week (34, 78).
Overall, this work suggests that an inability to move attention
away from non-relevant stimuli may be a vulnerability factor for
intrusive memory development. However, this work has focused
upon external trauma-related stimuli, and not internal represen-
tations as per an intrusive memory. Notably, there are a number of
similarities between attention toward internal and external repre-
sentations, in particular, in terms of behavioral responses (79, 80).
Thus, it may be possible to extrapolate the above trauma-related
findings to internal as well as external representations.
In healthy individuals, visual selective attention has been asso-
ciated with activity in widespread brain regions, including the
parietal, temporal, and prefrontal cortices (81). It has been pro-
posed that the frontal regions deal with specifying, consolidating,
and selecting targets, while the posterior parietal, occipital, and
temporal regions filter out distracting stimuli (82–84). Investiga-
tions into attention toward internal representations have shown
similar patterns of activation between internal and external stim-
uli but with some notable differences – right inferior parietal
cortex was selectively important for attention toward external
stimuli, while the frontal regions (in particular left inferior frontal
gyrus) were selectively important for internal stimuli (80, 85). Our
work investigating intrusive memory encoding (35, Clark et al.,
under review) highlights possible distinguishing activity in the left
inferior frontal gyrus for those moments that will later become
intrusive memories compared to those that will not. The left
inferior frontal gyrus has been associated with the selection of
information (86) and the “flexibility” to switch from one task to
another (87) and thus may represent attention hijacking within
intrusive memories, but this remains to be further explored.
Neuroimaging of attention in PTSD patients has shown
decreased activity in PTSD patients with high levels of symptoma-
tology compared to low symptomatology in dorsolateral PFC and
parietal regions for neutral targets, but increases in these regions
for emotional distractors. Additionally, in contrast to above,
bilateral inferior frontal gyrus activity was higher in patients with
low symptoms than those with high symptoms in response to the
emotional distractor stimuli (88). Further, attention toward emo-
tional distractors has been associated with the dorsolateral and
ventral PFC (89). Using non-emotional stimuli, research has sug-
gested a general hyper-vigilance of PTSD patients with increased
activation of somatosensory and posterior parietal attention
networks, inferior frontal gyrus and vmPFC, dorsal ACC,
and amygdala (90). To our knowledge, however, attention
toward internal stimuli in patients with PTSD has not yet been
investigated.
Mental Imagery
Mental imagery is a quasi-perceptual experience, in that it resem-
bles perception and sensory experiences, but occurs in the absence
of the appropriate perceptual and sensory stimuli (91, 92). There
are arguments that intrusive memories in PTSD are not limited to
sensory images, also including abstract thoughts; however, these
types of “intrusions” are more like rumination and not what we
aim to explain here [see also Ref. (93)]. Rather, we focus upon the
more common experience of intrusivememories as sensory-based
images (1, 94, 95).Mental imagery is highly connected to emotion,
causing the same emotional responses as seeing an object or event
itself (96). Additionally, mental imagery has been reported to
have a similar effect on the body as actually seeing the object or
event in question – skin conductance, heart, and breathing rate all
increase when visualizing threatening objects (97). Indeed,mental
imagery can also be confused with reality (96). Thus, given also
that emotional memories are thought to be perceptual in nature
(98), mental imagery may be an overarching component in why
intrusive memories are such distressing experiences.
Neuroimaging investigations of mental imagery support the
links between mental imagery, memory, emotion, and percep-
tion. First, neuroimaging research has consistently reported acti-
vation of the visual cortex during visual mental imagery (99).
Additionally, visual mental imagery has been found to activate
the middle frontal gyrus, the superior frontal gyrus, the middle
occipital cortex, right ACC, and the left inferior parietal cortex
(100), along with the hippocampus, amygdala, entorhinal cortex,
parahippocampal cortex, and the anterior insula (101, 102). Thus,
the experience of mental imagery additionally activates those
regions previously associated with autobiographical memory and
emotional processing as well as visual processing. Mental imagery
may therefore be key to linking the other components of our
intrusive memory framework.
We note here that the above evidence is focused upon visual
mental imagery. Visual intrusions are themost common following
trauma and are those that are typically studied in experimental
settings; however, intrusive memories can be in other sensory
modalities (e.g., audition and bodily sensations), physiological
or manifest in other behavioral ways (93). On the other hand,
given the connections between mental imagery and physiological
arousal and related factors, it is likely that mental imagery plays a
key role in all forms of intrusive recollections. Further, we suggest
that while changing from visual to, for example, auditory mental
imagery would change some of the brain regions activated (e.g.,
from visual cortex to primary auditory cortex), other underlying
mechanisms would remain the same.
Mapping the Experience of an Intrusive
Memory onto the Brain
Using our clinical-neuroscience framework, we hypothesize that
a series of events happen simultaneously to create an intrusive
memory (Figure 2). Neural mechanisms involved in involun-
tary recall activate the autobiographical (trauma) memory, which
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hijacks current selective attention. The mental imagery of the
autobiographical memory, which is activated by the involuntary
recall, intensifies the emotion of the event increasing the strength
and attention hijacking nature of the intrusive memory.
Figure 3 maps our clinical-neuroscience framework onto the
brain. The center of the diagram shows the different components
that make up an intrusive memory. Surrounding this are the brain
regions proposed to be involved. As can be seen, intrusive mem-
ories are a whole brain phenomenon with many areas involved in
multiple components of the intrusive memory framework. Addi-
tionally, many of the proposed brain regions identified in each of
the components (with the exception of involuntary recall) were
those also observed during intrusive memory encoding (35, 36
Clark et al., under review).
What, therefore, can be seen by mapping the hypothesized
components onto the brain? Interestingly, the brain areas involved
in mental imagery are also involved in the other proposed com-
ponents. For example, in addition to mental imagery, the frontal
areas of the brain have been associated with attention hijacking
and involuntary recall, suggesting that the frontal regions may be
involved in the spontaneous recollection of mental images. Areas
associated with autobiographical memory (predominantly the
medial temporal lobe, but also parietal and frontal regions) have
also been found to be involved in mental imagery, demonstrating
a possible connection between the traumatic memory and mental
imagery. Parietal regions, in addition to autobiographical memory
are also involved in attention hijacking, suggesting a link between
the traumatic memory and an overriding of attention. Amygdala
activation is predominantly associated with emotional processing
but also mental imagery and autobiographical memory, linking
the emotional response and the mental image of the traumatic
memory. Thus, there are connections between all five components
of our hypothesized model of intrusive memories, linking back to
mental imagery. Combining each of these individual components
via mental imagery, which on their own are required for normal
functioning, may lead to the experience of an intrusive memory.
Building Upon Previous Models of Intrusive
Memories
How does this help us? What do we gain by looking at intrusive
memories of trauma in this way? Much more work is needed
to understand intrusive memories, especially in terms of neuro-
science (50). Understanding how each component individually
contributes to intrusivememories, and the neuroscience behind it,
increases our knowledge of an otherwise incredibly complex phe-
nomenon. While our understanding of the neuroscience behind
intrusive memories per se is limited, much more is known about
the neuroscience of autobiographical memory, emotion, atten-
tion, and mental imagery outside of the clinical literature.
Further, the current model differs to previous models [e.g., Ref.
(21, 22)] in that we suggest that heightened memory processing,
not disrupted processing, may be important for intrusive mem-
ory formation. Additionally, we include a separate component
of attention hijacking. By doing so, we highlight the possible
involvement of more frontal regions of the brain in addition to
the subcortical regions noted by Brewin et al. (21). We also note
the overarching connection between each of the components that
make up an intrusive memory – that of mental imagery. While
imagery has often been associated with intrusive memories, our
framework suggests that it may be key in uniting all aspects of an
intrusive memory.
Predictions and Testable Hypotheses
By tailoring research in areas identified by our framework toward
intrusive memories and PTSD, we may be able to develop a better
clinical-neuroscience understanding of the patient’s experience of
intrusive memories. Further, by breaking intrusive memories into
our proposed components, we have a framework for developing
and testing hypotheses.
We hypothesize that mental imagery is an overarching com-
ponent of intrusive memories that has links to all of the other
components – while each of the other components may overlap
with others, mental imagery is the only one to unite all of the
components. By removing mental imagery, or occupying mental
imagery processes, we may be able to directly affect the forma-
tion and involuntary recall of intrusive memories. For example,
work using the visuospatial computer game Tetris has already
shown its ability to reduce visual intrusive memory frequency in
experimental settings (32, 103, 104). Further, a high tendency or
ability to use mental imagery may be an important risk factor in
intrusive memory development [e.g., Ref. (105)]. Understanding
howmental imagery relates to real world traumamay help develop
easy to administer screening measures for at-risk populations.
Additionally, mental imagery is also a broad term used to
encompass all aspects of perceptual information accessed from
memory (92). Intrusive memories do not have to be visual in
nature – some patients experience intrusive memories in the form
of audition or bodily sensations. A more precise understanding
of the specific aspects of mental imagery associated with intrusive
memories may further refine potential treatments. Adaptation of
imagery-based therapies to other modalities may be important
to address other types of intrusions. Further, while we suggest
that the underlying mechanisms involved in intrusive memories
of these different modalities may be similar to that of visual
intrusions, there may also be important differences between these
types of intrusive recollections that should be investigated in
future work.
We also suggest the possible importance of heightenedmemory
processing during exposure to moments of the trauma that later
return as intrusive memories (see also, 35, 36, Clark et al., under
review). This is in contrast to other clinical cognitive neuroscience
models of intrusive memories (22), but a proposal that has par-
allels with memory-based models of PTSD (38). Understanding
exactly how memory processes contribute to intrusive memory
formation and recall is essential for future work into the neural
basis of intrusive memories.
The proposed framework also suggests that we may be able to
disentangle emotional processing and the memory of the trauma.
The experience and subsequent memory of the trauma is required
for an intrusivememory, but the emotional reaction is whatmakes
the intrusive memory distressing for patients. Is it therefore pos-
sible to reduce the emotion associated with the intrusive memory,
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while keeping the memory itself intact? Additionally, how can
we go about doing this at a neural level? The overarching aim
of treatment is to reduce the distress associated with intrusive
memories – removing thememory itself is not necessarily the best
response (106).
In addition to the negative emotions brought to mind by
intrusive memories, their involuntary nature and hijacking of
attention further exacerbate the distressing effects. Establish-
ing and understanding possible neural differences between vol-
untary and involuntary autobiographical memory recall may
help pinpoint areas of memory that are distinct to intrusive
memories. From this, possible ways of reducing the frequency
of involuntary recall of these memories may become further
apparent.
The neural processes of attention suggest an important role
for frontal regions in allowing/enabling the intrusive memory to
come to the forefront of selective attention. Typically, decreased
ventral–medial PFC activity is associated with PTSD, which is
thought to reduce the control of the amygdala, heightening emo-
tional responses. However, the PFC may also be important in
the attention hijacking nature of intrusive memories, or toward
external stimuli that then trigger intrusive memories. Further
research is required to disentangle the role of attention in intrusive
memories. Understanding how an intrusive memory overrides
selective attention may present clues as to reducing intrusive
memory impact at involuntary recall.
Finally, the neural basis of the encoding of intrusive memo-
ries is an area that has received only recent attention. Further
work to understand the identified neural signature and how the
brain activity relates to underlying cognitive processes will help in
translating findings toward possible treatment development.
Discussion and Conclusion
We set out here a clinical-neuroscience framework that considers
intrusive memories as a combination of five component parts:
autobiographical (trauma) memory, involuntary recall, negative
emotions, attention hijacking, and mental imagery (Figure 2).
Our clinical-neuroscience framework aims to set out some
experimental hypotheses for mapping the brain processes that
contribute to the experience of intrusive memories. Intrusive
memories are a highly complex phenomenon – by considering
them as a combination of component parts, which individually
have received substantial research, we hope to suggest alternative
hypotheses that may otherwise go overlooked.
The need to bridge the gap between neuroscience and mental
illness is becoming increasingly recognized as a necessity for con-
tinued improvement of psychological therapies [e.g., Ref. (107–
109)]. Understanding mechanisms, both at the cognitive and
neural level, behind both symptom development and symptom
experience may go some way to help increase treatment efficacy.
Neuroscience provides a potential tool to help improve under-
standing of psychological symptoms. Our clinical-neuroscience
framework of intrusive memories presented here presents addi-
tional steps to help bridge neuroscience and the presentation of
intrusive memories, demonstrating the possibilities of combining
these two disparate areas.
Overall, we suggest that mental imagery may be key to the
formation and experience of an intrusive memory. Mapping the
neural correlates of the five component parts together (Figure 3)
suggests that mental imagery may be involved in combining the
components into the experience of an intrusive memory. That
is, mental imagery may bridge the experience, memory, emo-
tional processing, attentional hijacking, and intrusive recollection
of the traumatic event. By understanding the contribution of
mental imagery in particular to the development of intrusive
memories, we hope to be able to build a firmer bridge between
patient’s experiences and their psychological and neuroimaging
underpinnings.
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